There are a number of problems with the current use of
“evidence” regarding the presence or absence of Soviet (and Soviet bloc)
“tourists” in Romania during the 1989 revolution. They appear repeatedly, for
example, in perhaps the only (partly) English-language blog dedicated solely to
Romania’s revolution, run by Richard Andrew Hall. (See Richard Hall Blog)
Hall begins a series of posts on what he regards as lessons learned
about the 1989 Revolution with one entitled: “The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising”
(Securitate being Romanian short-hand
for the Department of State Security or DSS). Hall claims to prove that the
presence of Soviet tourists is a “myth” and an “absurdity” based on former DSS
officer witness depositions and a media report. (#1
Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation)
Hall insists that this evidence proves his argument in many
of his subsequent posts, (see, for example, #8
Romania Closes its Borders to Almost All Foreigners … Except Russian Tourists
Returning from Shopping Trips to Yugoslavia.) Before examining this evidence
it is worth noting that Hall steadfastly ignores the context of Soviet-Romanian
relations, nor does he seem aware of the USSR’s repeated use of “tourist” cover
for intelligence, paramilitary and military operations in the Soviet bloc (including
Romania) prior to 1989. He also appears to assume that Moscow had no motives
for forcing a change in Romanian policy under the right circumstances. (See Romanian
Revolution December 1989 (II) Divining Soviet Intent)
Hall persistently confuses the ethical problem of
responsibility with that of agency, seeking “who is to blame” rather focusing
on “how something happened.” Setting off
from the premise that the DSS was culpable for all or most of the violence
perpetrated in 1989 necessarily blinds the analyst to any evidence of outside
involvement. Indeed, when arguing this hypothesis Hall repeatedly shifts from a
discussion of “tourist” presence to the specific roles “tourists” played (or
rather did not play) in Timisoara, thus misusing testimony to the effect that
foreigners were not observed playing such roles as proof that they were not
observed – and therefore not present – at all.
Unfortunately, none of the DSS testimony cited by Hall was
generated during the event for internal purposes. All of it was generated after
the fact and for a specific audience: the Romanian courts. Each of the DSS
officers giving testimony was under investigation. No matter their individual strength
of character, each had a vested personal interest in not antagonizing their
interrogators.
The reader should know that historians and courts both
regard eyewitness testimony as the least reliable form of evidence because
memory is so easily manipulated. The reliability of testimony rapidly declines
within days of an event. Weeks and months after the fact the accuracy and value
of testimony becomes highly questionable. With time, memory falls increasingly
under the influence of emerging public interpretation while subsequently formed
impressions increasingly replace forgotten details.
Hall claims that the four testimonies he originally cited
were written “immediately after the December 1989 events.” That is not
true. The testimony most proximate to those events, that of Niculae Mavru, was
written more than three weeks later, and a second citation from Mavru eighteen
months later. The second-most proximate, Emil Macri, testified one and a half
months later. The third, Filip Teodorescu, submitted his testimony one month
and three weeks after the events. And the least proximate, Liviu Dinulescu,
gave his testimony a full year and half later.
Testimony Under Duress
The fact that Hall does not dwell on how those testimonies came into being is also problematic. The circumstances in which testimony is given can have a significant influence on its content. Testimony is highly susceptible to distortion over time even when third-party influence is benign. Testimony is even more susceptible to distortion when given under duress.
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| General Vlad on Trial |
Several DSS officers have complained of being told during
the 1990 trials that they would be acquitted if they denied any Soviet bloc
presence during the revolution. Interestingly, none of the DSS sources cited by
Hall as denying the existence of “tourists” was convicted (3 were acquitted and
one died before trial). All of their cited testimonies had been made in the
quality of witness in the trials of others. On the other hand, several of the
DSS officers convicted, including DSS chief Iulian Vlad, insisted on the Soviet
bloc presence at their trials and in later hearings before various Senate
commissions of inquiry. A rigorous comparison of the depositions given by the
convicted and the acquitted DSS officers might set this particular devil to
rest, one way or the other. (See e.g. S. Sandulescu, Decembrie ’89: Lovitura De Stat A Confiscat Revolutia Romana
(1996): 158-208)
Hall evades discussion of these problematic circumstances
with the rather astonishing claim that coercive influence on DSS
officer testimony is not “terribly plausible.” A serious effort to gauge
plausibility would start with an examination of the circumstances in 1990-1991
when these depositions were given. Mainstream opinion at that time held the DSS
to be the “most brutal” repressive institution in the Soviet bloc. There was
even a concerted effort to brand it – along with the entire communist regime –
as a completely illegitimate criminal institution (an anomaly among the former
Warsaw Pact members).
By the end of December 1989, DSS personnel had not only lost
their jobs, they were also subject to criminal investigation and incarceration,
with the distinct possibility of long-term imprisonment. Some of the very
officers cited by Hall spent time in jail previous to their testimony. Only the
most obtuse would not have experienced these circumstances as coercive
pressure. Contrary to Hall’s denials, it is in fact highly plausible that a
number of DSS personnel tailored their testimony in order to please their
jailers (or potential jailers). Such “tailoring” does not require one to commit
perjury. Topics towards which interrogators show disinterest or hostility can
simply be avoided. And one can employ ambiguity to allow for multiple
interpretations; that preferred by interrogators as well as the truth.
The Brief Coup of Pro-Soviet Officers
Pressure on those affirming a Soviet presence was particularly evident, and it is obvious why it should have been so. In the midst of the revolution, on December 23, General Nicolae Militaru, forcibly retired eleven years earlier when he was caught red-handed spying for the Soviet Union, set himself up as the new head of the Romanian Army. He was confirmed as defense minister on December 24, 1989, only to be dismissed from that position seven weeks later for bringing about the disintegration of the Romanian Army. Militaru bragged about his Soviet contacts in his famous joint interview with co-conspirator Silviu Brucan. (Adevarul, 23/8/90)
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| General Nicolae Militaru |
The DSS was subordinated to the military on December 26, two
days after Militaru officially took over the Defense Ministry and the Army,
which gave the Soviet agent control of the DSS while it underwent
reorganization. Whatever residual bureaucratic leverage the DSS may have
possessed disappeared with its formal dissolution on December 30, 1989.
Militaru reactivated some 30, mostly Soviet-trained officers (many known or
suspected of being Soviet agents) and appointed them to senior positions in the
military and in the newly forming security intelligence institutions under his
control. This wave included the new foreign intelligence chief (and former DSS
foreign counterintelligence chief) Mihai Caraman, and the advisor to the
vice-prime minister (and former DSS foreign intelligence chief) Nicolae
Doicaru, as well as the new interior minister, chief of the general staff,
chief of military intelligence, etc.
The military prosecutors and military court trying DSS
personnel in the immediate aftermath of the revolution were also subordinate to
Defense Minister Militaru. In fact, Militaru exercised direct control over who
was incarcerated, tried and convicted until February 14, 1990, when he was
dismissed. And no major reforms were undertaken or personnel changes instituted
in the military justice system prior to the first constitutional election in
1992.
Even if the kangaroo court and summary execution of the
Ceausescus on the flatly ridiculous charge of genocide had not made the entire
world aware of how fast and loose the Romanian military justice system operated
at that time, it would still strain credulity to deny the manifest interest of
Soviet agents in obscuring their roles.
The more closely one examines Hall’s evidence the more
problematic it appears. Hall quotes Filip Teodorescu from a January 12, 1990
deposition regarding his report from Timisoara on the evening of December 18
that “there is no data indicating any leaders or instigators coming from
abroad.” [nu sint date ca ar exista
instigatori sau conducatori anume veniti din strainatate.]“ In another
posting Hall draws attention to General Vlad’s July 19, 1991 deposition stating
“More precisely, those sent by me to Timisoara reported that they had no
evidence indicating any foreign involvement in producing the events in
Timisoara.” [Mai exact, cei trimis de mine
la Timisoara mi-au raportat ca nu au elemente din care sa rezulte vreum amestec
al strainatatii in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.] (Vlad Testimony, 19/07/91)
Cherry-Picking the Testimony
It would appear that Hall is cherry-picking the evidence. As related by Vlad’s chef de cabinet and confirmed by General Vlad to this author, Teodorescu’s initial report on December 18, 1989 stated that “there was not enough manpower to prevent access [to Timisoara] on the Buzias Road” and the militia thus “left access into Timisoara from this direction open.” [nu au existat fortele necesare pentru interzicerea accesului prin Calea Buziasului, deoarece … a ramas descoperitat directia respective de access in Timisoara.] This lead to the following exchange:
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| Col. Teodorescu |
Gen. Vlad: “And
did they enter?”
Teodorescu: “Some 3-4
automobiles entered, each with 2-3 occupants.”
Gen. Vlad: “And
what did they do?”
Teodorescu: “We don’t
know.”
Gen. Vlad: “I’ll tell you what they did. They
performed their mission and moved on. Do not leave the [local DSS]
headquarters, so that you are not blamed for their provocations.”
(A. Rogojean, Fereastra serviciilor secrete (2011):
158-9)
Within two months of his initial testimony
Teodorescu was describing publicly how he had “detained foreign agents during
the Timisoara events.” (Romania Libera,
9/03/90) In his subsequent statements Teodorescu consistently noted how DSS
attention was “drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists”
claiming to be “in transit to Yugoslavia.” “Unfortunately,” Teodorescu
notes, “we did not have enough manpower and conditions did not allow us to
monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists'.” [Ne-a atras atentia numarul nejustificat de
mare de turisti sovietici, fie cu autobuze, fie cu autoturisme. … Declarau cu
totii ca sint in transit pentru Iugoslavia. … Din pacate nu dispuneam de
forte si nici conditiile nu au permis; pentru a urmari activitatea macar a unor
dintre “turisti”.] (F. Teodorescu, Un
Risc Asumat (1992): 92)
Hall misrepresents the testimony of General Vlad in a
similar manner. Elsewhere in facsimile reproduction of that testimony (but not
translated by Hall), Vlad made the following clarification: “I mention that the mission of Gen. Macri and
of the others that I sent to Timisoara was to establish, in the first place,
what involvement foreigner and foreign interests had in setting off the events,
because the data base of which we disposed from foreign sources indicated
this…” [Mentionez ca misiunea gl. Macri
si a celorlalti pe care l-am trimis la Timisoara a fost aceea de a se stabili
in primul rind ce amestec au strainii si strainatatea in declansarea
evenimentelor, intrucit pe baza datelor pe care le detineam din surse externe,
rezulta acest lucru…] (Vlad Testimony, 19/07/91)
A related problem appears when one reads the entire page of
Nicolae Mavru’s testimony, of which Hall translates only those sections
asserting that “(there were not any [foreigners]) who incited disorder, acts of
violence or other acts”; that “Although we tried we could not report to Col.
Sima the complete involvement of any foreign citizen in the evolution of the
demonstrations”; and that he was unable to discover any foreign involvement. [(nu prea au fost) care incita la dezordine,
acte de violenta sau altfel de acte… (13/01/90) Desi ne-am straduit nu am putut raporta col. Sima implicarea completa a
vreunui cetatean strain in evolutia demonstratiilor. Cu toate eforturile facute
nu a rezultat lucru pe linia mea de munca.] (25/06/91)]
Hall is using Mavru to support his compound assertion that Soviet
“tourists” were neither involved nor present during the revolution in
Timisoara. According to Hall, therefore, Mavru, Tedorescu, Macri and Dinulescu
all claimed that: “they could find no such
presence and role played by Soviet tourists.” However, none of those
officers claim that Soviet tourists were not present. They insist only that,
according to their investigation, foreigners were not leading or overtly
instigating the events in Timisoara. In the facsimile reproduced by Hall,
Mavru actually goes on to explain that Vlad’s request for intelligence on
possible foreign involvement was motivated by the extraordinarily large numbers
of foreigners appearing in the region:
“The order of Col. Sima referring to foreign elements was
justified because an exodus of visitors from foreign states to the dwelling of
Pastor Tokes had begun two months earlier. Thus, there existed suspicion of the
implication of circles from other states in the launching of the events in
Timisoara. I would also like to point out that in November approximately 1500 persons
from one and the same neighboring state appeared in Timis county and the city
of Timisoara, usually men, whom I was not able to keep under surveillance,
because of lack of manpower. I reported details regarding these foreigners only
verbally without drawing up any notes.” [Ordinul
col. Sima referitor la elementele straine era justificate pentru ca cu 2 luni
mai inainte incepuse un exot de vizitatori din statele straine la locuinta
pastorului Tokes. Deci exista banuiala implicarii cercurilor din alte state in
declansarea evenimentele la Timisoara. Tin sa precizez ca in noiembrie aproximativ
1500 din unul si acelasi stat vecin au aparut in judetul Timis si orasul
Timisoara, de regula barbate care nu i-am putut supraveghea, din [lipsa] de
oameni (forte).] (#1
Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation)
Two the original four testimonial sources cited by Hall as
proof of Soviet non-implication in the Timisoara events provide much stronger
evidence for the counterargument; that the Soviets were present and vexatious.
Indeed, both Mavru and Teodorescu insist on the unusual influx of Soviet bloc
“tourists” into Romania immediately preceeding and during the December 1989
revolution.
But testimonies from former DSS officers are not the only
evidence cited by Hall. He also cites media reporting as providing ‘definitive’
proof that there were no Soviet “tourists” coming over the border in worrisome
quantity.
To Be Continued
The Romanian Version is at Adevarul.ro
To Be Continued
The Romanian Version is at Adevarul.ro
