The
utility of any primary source evidence for evaluating leadership policy
(whether state, government or party) is dependent on its origins and
intention. There is often a wide variance between declared policy –
produced for public consumption and expressed in official statements and media
reports – and actual policy as reflected in internal reports, military planning
and deployments and clandestine operations. Any thorough comparison of the two
documentary records in any country reveals that governments frequently do not
mean what they say. (See, e.g., J. L. Gaddis, “Expanding the Data Base:
Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies,” International
Security, vol. 12, no. 1 (1987): 7, 9)
Historians
rank primary source evidence according to their general reliability, accuracy
and vulnerability to interested manipulation. The least accurate and least
reliable are media reports. For a variety of reasons the press as institution
is the most vulnerable to internal and external manipulation. Public
communiqués establishing official positions and reactions, while usually more
accurate in terms of declaratory policy, are also a form of self-interested and
self-conscious political advertising – an image of policy that leaders
purposefully project to domestic populations, allies and adversaries – and thus
often not a faithful reflection of actual policy.
More
accurate are diplomatic correspondence and instructions. However, diplomats
often employ misrepresentation, misdirection, and subterfuge at the direction
of their superiors in pursuit of state and national goals. And, on occasion,
leaderships mislead their own diplomats to achieve such ends; so that the
diplomat believes the misdirection he propagates and therefore does so more
credibly.
Most
accurate and reliable are executive decisions, internal discussions and
intra-governmental instructions that are not designed for public consumption.
These documents best reflect real intent and policy. Actual military (and
intelligence) plans and deployments are often considered highly accurate
indicators of intent and policy. However, these institutions are also more
susceptible to bureaucratic inertia and may reflect defunct policies of former
leaders, regimes and international situations rather than current policy during
periods of transition. The Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko era plans and
deployments that for the most part remained in effect in the Soviet military
and KGB under Gorbachev’s “New Thinking in Foreign Policy” during 1988-1991
provide a case in point.
Ceteris paribus, executive decisions and internal governmental discussions not meant
for public consumption easily trump media reports in terms of accuracy and
credibility. They especially trump reports from international (rather than
local) media, which are the least likely to reflect accurately the internal
deliberations, decisions and intentions of a foreign leadership. Where a media
report contradicts a contemporaneous internal report, the internal report
easily constitutes the better evidence (unless, of course, it can be proven
that it was created specifically to be “leaked” publicly or for disinformation
purposes.)
In
his discussions of Romania’s December 1989 revolution, Richard Andrew Hall
overturns this hierarchy, dismissing the primacy of documented internal
leadership deliberations in favor of international media reporting that
supports his argument, and accepting and promoting their dubious assertions as
solid fact. From this rickety base Hall then makes other assertions dependent
upon it such that the careless reader is led off into a wilderness of
speculation and self-contradiction.
Was Ceausescu Worried About "Soviet Tourists" Or Not?
For
example, Hall claims that the Ceausescu regime was not especially concerned
regarding Soviet “tourists” in December 1989 based on an Agence-France Press
(AFP) report of December 19, 1989. According to the French journalist, a
Romanian border guard declared that the “border was closed to everyone but the
Soviets!” In more than a dozen blog posts Hall insists that this proves the
regime was neither worried about nor taking measures against Soviet “tourists.”
(AFP 19/12/89 reproduced in Hall)
To
his credit, after his first use of this evidence in his dissertation written in
the 1990s, Hall has cited the subsequently published transcripts of the
December 17, 1989 meeting of Romanian Communist Party’s (RCP) Political
Executive Committee (PolExCom), in which Ceausescu condemns Soviet bloc
“tourism” and orders that it be shut down immediately:
“I have also given the order
to interrupt all tourist activity. Not a single foreign tourist should be
allowed in, because all have become espionage agents. Likewise, the small
cross-border traffic should be shut down immediately. I have given the order to
the Ministry of Interior but those from [Ministry of] Tourism must be called
immediately, and the unoccupied rooms should be given to Romanian citizens.
No
one should be allowed in from the socialist countries, aside from Korea, China
and Cuba. Because none of the neighboring socialist countries can be trusted.
Those from neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents. We are shutting
down all tourist activity.
A state of emergency is declared for all
counties. The units of the Military, of the Ministry of Interior, of the State
Security are in a state of emergency.
We should give the
instruction in the teleconference to take all measures against any attempt,
because we must defend the independence of the fatherland and socialism against
anyone, no matter who it is.”
[Am
dat, de altfel, indicatia sa se intrerupa orice activitate de turism. Nu
trebuie sa mai vina niciun turist din strainatate, pentru ca toti s-au
transformat in agenti de spionaj. De asemenea, sa se intrerupa micul trafic de
frontiera imediat. Am dat ordin la Ministerul de Interne, dar trebuie chemati
si cei de la turism imediat, iar locurile neocupate sa fie date la cetateni
romani. Nici din tarile socialiste sa nu mai vina, in afara de Coreea, de
China si din Cuba. Pentru ca toate tarile socialiste vecine nu prezinta
incredere. Cei din tarile socialiste vecine sunt trimisi ca agenti. Intrerupem
orice activitate de turism. La toate judetele se va declara stare de alarma.
Unitatile militare, ale Ministerului de Interne, ale Securitatii sunt in stare
de alarma. Sa dam la teleconferinta indicatia ca sa se ia toate masurile
fata de orice incercare, pentru ca trebuie sa aparam independenta patriei si a
socialismului impotriva oricaruia, indiferent cine este. Acestea sunt
problemele care se pun acum. (Hall
cites M. Bunea, Praf in ochi (1994): 34. The original transcript was
found in the military court archives by V. Roncea and is reproduced here CPEX Transcript 12/17/89.)
"Soviet
bloc “tourism” – the only significant “tourism” during that period – was
likewise implicitly condemned in the teleconference following that meeting: “We
have ordered that foreign tourists will not be received for awhile and that the
so-called small cross-border traffic will also be discontinued. We suspend it!
We will restart it later. Now we do not have time for small cross-border
traffic! Each one should be occupied with their own problems! We must not admit
anyone, neither foreigners and nor anyone from the country, those who are
caught engaging in anti-socialist activities should be struck without mercy,
with no [other] justification, and we should tell the people clearly, to avoid
any ambiguity!”
[Am
stabilit sa nu mai primim in perioada urmatoare turisti straini sis a nu mai
aiba lo casa-zisul mic trafic de frontiera. Il suspendam! Vom reveni mai
tirziu. Acum nu avem timp de mic trafic de frontiera! Fiecare sa se ocupe de
problemele lor!
Nu trebuie sa admitim, si oricine, si strainii, dar si din tara, care
sint prinsi ca desfasoara ativitate antisocialista trebuie loviti fara crutare,
fara nici un fel de justificare si trebuie sa supunem poporului clar, nu sa
umblam cu subintelesuri!] (Arhiva Nationale, fond CC al PCR, Sectia Cancelarie, dosar
338/1989; See also page 8 of Teleconference 12/17/89)
How
does Hall deal with this? He insists Ceausescu was merely being paranoid and
argues that, since “Ceausescu had ordered not just that Soviet tourists,
but that all tourists, from East and West” be stopped, the dictator was
not especially concerned with Soviet “tourists.”
The problem with Hall’s reasoning is that specific complaint was made only against Soviet bloc“tourists.” Aside from the odd Bucharest-based diplomat attempting to visit Timisoara the only troublesome Westerners were the journalists who attended the RCP Plenum in November and never left. Although Ceausescu never mentioned western “tourists,” he did single out the socialist countries three times. First, to order that none of their citizens be allowed into Romania, then to underscore that none of them were trustworthy, and finally, to underscore that all “tourists” sent to Romania from the socialist countries came as hostile espionage agents. And the repeated reference to “small cross-border traffic” can only refer to the traffic into Romania from its socialist neighbors.
Hall
dismisses more recent evidence regarding Ceausescu’s preoccupation with Soviet
“tourists” in similar fashion. Consider, for example, the correspondence
between Bucharest and its embassy in Moscow in December 1989. (Originally
reproduced in D. Preda and M. Retegan, 1989: Principiul Dominoului
(2000): 445-498. Some of this correspondence is translated in M. Munteanu, “New
Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania (2001): 3-11, Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists)
According
to Hall, this diplomatic correspondence “never once” mentions or objects to
“the presence or behavior of ‘Soviet tourists’ in Romania during these chaotic
days of crisis for the Ceausescu regime.” (Hall on Romanian Diplomatic
Correspondence)
One
wonders whether Hall read the diplomatic correspondence that he reproduces. The
December 17 PolExCom meeting not only identified the Soviet “tourists” as
agents entering the country to engage in hostile espionage – which certainly
qualifies as “mentioning” and “objecting” to Soviet behavior in Romania – it
also ordered a halt to all Soviet bloc tourism (Telegram no. 20/016 750,
12/17/89). Reporting on his implementation of the December 17 order the
next day, the Romanian ambassador in Moscow noted that as of “the morning
of December 18, Soviet citizens have been telephoning the Embassy from border
points with Romania, reporting that there are hundreds of automobiles that are
not being permitted entry into our country.”
[Incepand
din dimineata zilei de 18 decembrie a.c., cetateni sovietici au inceput sa faca
apeluri telefonice la Ambasada, de la punctele de frontiera cu Romania,
semnaland ca sunt sute de masini carora nu li se permite intrarea in tara
noastra si anticipam ca autoritatile sovietice vor solicita explicatii in
legatura cu decizia luata.] (Doc. 258 in Preda and Retegan; Doc. 1 in Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists)
The
ambassador then requested instructions from his ministry on how to field Soviet
demands for explanation of the border closure.
On
December 21 the Romanian ambassador explained to the Soviet Foreign Ministry
that the closure of the border “to Soviet citizens, especially tourists” was a
“temporary” measure “for limiting the access of some groups of foreign
tourists,” much like Moscow had done in “restricting the travel of Romanian
tourists” at certain times to Georgia and Armenia. The ambassador then
suggested the linkage between Soviet “tourists” and espionage agents by
following up with a reiteration of Romania’s “decision to repulse any attempt
to interfere in its domestic affairs and to take decisive measures against any
provocative or subversive actions initiated by reactionary, anti-Romanian
circles, secret services or foreign espionage agencies.” (Doc. 278 in
Preda and Retegan; Doc. 4 in Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists)
In
one document apparently missed by Hall (and Munteanu), the Romanian Embassy in
Moscow relayed the Soviet television broadcast of December 19, which reported
“the closing of the border in a unilateral manner by our country” and presented
the official communiqués issued “by the Soviet tourist agency Intourist,
and by the [tourist] agency of the GDR, regarding the temporary halting of
tourist travel to our country from these countries.” Thus, it would appear,
Soviet media sources did confirm the ban against Soviet “tourists.” On December
20 further confirmations appeared in Pravda, Sovietskaia Rossiia,
Izvestia, Selskaia Zhizni, Komsomolskaia Pravda, and Sotsialisticheskovo
Industriia bearing titles like “A Worsening Border Regime,” Tensions with
Romania,” and “Tensions on the Borders of Romania.” (Document 276 in
Preda and Retegan)
In
spite of this daily mention of Soviet “tourists” ever since Ceausescu first
ordered that they be stopped at the borders on December 17, Hall considers his
contention that the regime was unconcerned by Soviet “tourism” proved by the AFP
report of December 19, 1989, claiming that two Romanian border guards at the
frontier with Yugoslavia told a journalist to: “Go back home, only Russians can
get through!” Hall reproduces this report in subsequent posts as if it were an
unproblematic truth – and better evidence than the Transcript of the PolExCom
meeting of December 17, 1989. “Why,” Hall asks rhetorically, “was it precisely
‘Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia’ who were the
only group declared exempt from the ban on “tourism” announced on that
day?” (Hall on Soviet Tourists #1)
It is possible, although not plausible, that the journalist actually heard –
and the border guards actually made – such a declaration. In no way, however,
could that be taken as representative of Romanian policy at the time.
Documentary “best evidence” indicates that no such exemption was ever given.
Importance of Nuance
Relying
on a translation provided by Mircea Munteanu (Document 5 in Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists)
Hall makes much of an alleged statement on December 21 by the Romanian
ambassador to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that the “limitations do not apply
to business travel or tourists transiting Romania,” as proving Bucharest’s lack
of concern regarding Soviet “tourists”. (Hall on Soviet Tourists #1)
Unfortunately,
Munteanu’s translation is in error. In fact, the ambassador specifies an
exemption only for “those in transit” and not for “tourists transiting
Romania.” Given that the Romanian-Soviet discussion at that point was precisely
about “the closing of the Soviet-Romanian frontier” to tourists, it stands to
reason that the ambassador’s reference was to transit for non-touristic
purposes. Readers may judge for themselves which of these translations best
reflects the meaning of the original:
“In
legatura cu problema turismului, am mentionat ca nu dispun de o comunicare oficiala
privind inchiderea frontierei soviet-romane. Am aratat, totodata, ca au fost adoptate unele masuri temporare privind
limitarea accesului unor grupuri de turisti straini, din considerente
legate de dificultatile de asigurare a hotelurilor si a conditiilor
corespunzatoare. Aceste masuri nu afecteaza
calatoriile in interes de serviciu si nici pe cele in transit.”
(Romanian original - Doc. 278 in Preda and Retegan)
English
translation by Munteanu:
“With
regard to the issue of tourists crossing the border in Romania, I said that I
did not possess an official communication in this regard. I suggested that some
temporary measures were adopted due to the need to limit access of certain
groups of tourists [in the country]. [Those limitations were imposed] due to
difficulties in assuring their access to hotel rooms and other related
essential conditions. Those limitations
do not apply to business travel or tourists
transiting Romania.”
(Doc.
5 in Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists.
Brackets added by Munteanu.)
English
translation by Watts:
“In
connection with the issue of tourism, I mentioned that I did not dispose of an
official communication regarding the closing of the Soviet-Romanian frontier. I
explained, at the same time, that some temporary measures were adopted for limiting the access of some groups of
foreign tourists, from considerations connected with the difficulties
of assuring hotels and appropriate conditions. These measures do not affect travel for official purposes or those in
transit.”
In
fact, only several days earlier Bucharest had decided to continue a very
specific form of non-tourist transit traffic from the Soviet Union. This exception
is described by the Romanian ambassador in his December 18 Telegram.
“The Consulate Section has continuously accorded transit visas
for Jews from the USSR who have approval to
settle in Israel, as well as for foreign students studying in the USSR.
Since the chief representative of TAROM has received instructions to continue
this transit traffic in the normal way, we request that you communicate to us
clarification on how to act in such cases.” (Watts translation from Doc. 258 in Preda and Retegan)
[In
mod continuu, la Sectia consulara s-au acordat vize de transit pentru evreii
din URSS, care au aprobare sa se stabileasca in
Israel, precum si pentru studentii straini care invata in URSS. Intrucat seful
reprezentatei TAROM a primit orientarea de a continua traficul de transit in
mod normal, rugam sa ni se comunice clarificari asupra modului cum actionam in
astfel de cazuri.] (Romanian
original - Doc. 258 in Preda and Retegan)
In his translation of the same document Munteanu intercedes with
a note of his own specifying that the approvals were given by Moscow:
“Continuously,
at the Consular Section, we have given transit visas to Soviet Jews who have the approval [of the Soviet government]
to emigrate to Israel.”
(Doc.
1 in Munteanu - Correspondence on Soviet Tourists.
Bracket added by Munteanu.)
This
time the error is one of nuance. But that nuance has significant implications.
Munteanu translates “se stabileasca” as “emigrate (emigra)” but
it is more accurately translated as “to settle” or “immigrate (imigra).”
Obviously, only Tel Aviv could decide who was
approved to settle in or immigrate to Israel. Munteanu’s stipulation of Soviet
government approval for such transit does not clarify; it misleads. The
sentence actually describes an established Romanian practice of granting visas
to Soviet Jews leaving the USSR. It makes no reference to Soviet authority
because the visa exception existed as a result of Romania’s long-term
cooperation with Israel, not because of Soviet initiative. The TAROM
representative was instructed to continue this practice by Bucharest, not by
Moscow.
In
the internal deliberations of the Political Executive Committee on December 17,
1989, Ceausescu ordered a halt to “all tourism” from “the neighboring socialist
countries” because those tourists operated as “espionage agents.” He also
forcefully expressed his belief that the USSR bore chief responsibility for
organizing “all that happened and is happening in [East] Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria now, and in the past in Poland and Hungary.”
(See CPEX Transcript 12/17/89.) Ceausescu viewed
Moscow as driving this process, and the United States in a supporting role. The
diplomatic correspondence between the Romanian foreign ministry and its embassy
in Moscow explicitly identified Soviet tourism as a problem that Bucharest
prohibited. Together, the internal executive deliberations and Romanian
diplomatic correspondence soundly debunk AFP’s claim that Soviet tourists had
free entry, not the other way round.
Media Meltdown in December 1989
There
are, however, other problems with credibility of the AFP report. Although the
violence had produced
50-70 casualties at the time, AFP reported “thousands” were killed in
Timisoara. AFP likewise claimed that “at least 1,000” of these alleged
fatalities were located in a single hospital, when the total number of losses
in Timisoara during the entire revolution was less than 200. These are grim
comparisons and they were not confined to AFP or the French media, but they
bear directly on factual reliability. Although Hall focused his attention on
the claim that the tourism ban applied to “all but Soviet travellers,” later in
the same article AFP reversed itself to report that the ban applied to “all
travellers.” (“Travelers Say ‘Hundreds’ Dead, Wounded” in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, East Europe, FBIS-EEU-89-242, 19 December 1989: 85)
In
fact, international press coverage of the Romanian revolution was so
outrageously manipulated that it is now used as a case study of journalistic
ineptitude and media failure. According to the conclusions of one inquiry into
the manipulation of news coverage during December 1989, the “misreporting of
events in Timisoara by French media,” including even that of the “usually
reputable French news agency AFP,” will “go down in history” as “an example of
journalists failing to check the accuracy of the news they broadcast.” (Failure of French Media Coverage in December 1989)
Solid
research methodology might not deliver results anticipated or desired, but it
will bring us closer to answers that the evidence actually supports. Testimony
after the fact and media reports crafted for public consumption are almost
never superior in accuracy and reliability to non-public internal deliberations
and decisions produced in the course of events. Continued reliance on the
former to the neglect of the latter is unlikely to answer or clarify the
outstanding questions regarding Romania’s Revolution of December 1989.
