Introduction
On 3-4 October 2014, the second
roundtable on Interethnic Dialogue in the
New Romania: "Romanians and the Hungarian Minority Twenty-Five Years After
the 1989 Revolution was convened in Poiana Brasov under the auspices of the
non-governmental organization Friends of the Project on Ethnic Relations
(FPER). As a follow-up to the first held on 14-15 June 2014, this roundtable
focused on consolidating the Romanian model of interethnic relations and
discussing ways and means of effectively addressing outstanding issues in the ethnic
Hungarian–ethnic Romanian relationship, especially the issue of autonomy.[1]
Although only several months had passed since the first roundtable, all of the
participants, which included representatives of all the political parties in
the Romanian parliament as well as civic society and media representatives of
both ethnicities, were unanimous in their call for a second round before the November
2014 presidential elections.
The first roundtable had provided
the opportunity for both sides to present positions and problems from their
perspective, to reacquaint themselves with the positions and perspectives of
their partners, and to discuss ways and means of addressing outstanding issues
and to better understand the hurdles and hiccups that confront the formation
and implementation of ethnic policy. A significant focus of the second
roundtable was the reformulation of both sides’ positions to better take into
account the perspectives and positions of the other side in the dialogue.
The following summary and analysis
was drawn up by the rapporteur, Larry Watts, and does not necessarily represent
the official position of any Romanian or ethnic Hungarian party or of other
persons who participated in the roundtable. Participants have not had the
opportunity to review this text, for which the Friends of the Project on Ethnic
Relations is solely responsible.
Background
The second roundtable took place
under even more complicated domestic and international circumstances than its
predecessor. Against the backdrop of rising extremism in Europe, Russia’s
Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s Viktor Orban continued to fan ethnic tensions in
the region. Russian forces had militarily occupied and annexed Crimea from
Ukraine not long before the first roundtable convened. Between the roundtables,
during the summer of 2014, Russia invaded eastern Ukraine and Vladimir Putin
premised the Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine
on the claimed need to protect ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minorities
abroad.[2]
Shortly after the first roundtable,
while visiting Romania in July 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban delivered
a vituperative attack against liberal democracy while announcing his intention
to create an “illiberal state” and acknowledging Vladimir Putin’s Russia, with
which Orban had become closely allied, as a source of his inspiration.[3] Budapest
continued to demand territorial autonomy and secession rights for Hungarian
minorities in Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and Slovakia while reaffirming Hungary’s
commitment to a 1992 accord with Russia in which both sides asserted their
claim of authority over their respective minorities in neighboring countries.[4]
The timing of the second roundtable,
one month before Romania’s 2014 presidential elections, also raised some fears that
the process would quickly become fodder for partisan political competitors,
both compromising interethnic dialogue and allowing one or more competitors to
exploit it for unfair electoral advantage. Scheduling conflicts on part of the
American participants had postponed the roundtable from starting at the
beginning of September, as initially projected, until October 3, the official
start of the presidential campaign. Had any of the participants wished to
exploit the dialogue for partisan purposes they certainly could have done so.
As it turned out, all of the
participants, not only representatives of the parties engaged in the election
but also those from civic organizations and the media, honored their pledge not
to do so and neither the fact of the roundtable and nor its proceedings were
mentioned during the electoral campaign. This is perhaps especially notable
because the prime minister, one of the (ultimately unsuccessful) candidates for
the presidency, had expressed his written support prior to the roundtable but
did not exploit that fact for electoral advantage.
However, the discussions were not unaffected
by the electoral competition. For example, although it was generally
acknowledged at the first roundtable that movement on issues of even immediate
concern was likely to be marginal before the elections, Romanian authorities
were criticized for this lack of movement nonetheless during the second round. In
addition, pressures created by the electoral campaign partly determined the
UDMR’s public announcement of its autonomy project several weeks before the
roundtable. Thus, an important element of the new round of discussions focused
on identifying workable and problematic aspects of the project and better
defining the concept of autonomy.
As PER President Emeritus Allen
Kassof observed, the roundtable was occurring amidst headlines about lethal
conflict in Ukraine, the Scottish referendum on separation from the United
Kingdom (voted down just two weeks earlier) and rising secessionist trends in
Catalonia, Spain.[5] In
the final analysis, however, Romanian interethnic relations would be decided in
Romania, by the people engaged in this dialogue. “Your predecessors,” Kassof
underscored, established a commitment to interethnic dialogue that was “unique
in the region, which I know will serve you well.”
As always, the discussion was
informal and off-the-record. Comments and statements were those of the
individual participants and did not necessarily represent parties or
institutions, unless so stipulated by the discussant. Participants were asked
not to quote individual speakers but were permitted to reference what was said
in the discussions.
The Project on Ethnic Relations in Romania
PER was a privately funded U.S.-based
non-governmental organization based in Princeton, N.J. with the mission of
preventing violent conflict and fostering ethnic harmony in the former Soviet
space. PER worked widely in the region to provide a neutral forum for
discussion for more than two decades in 1991-2012. During that time PER held
meetings between ethnic Hungarian and Romanian leaders in Romania, Switzerland
and the United States.[6] Former
Princeton professor Allen Kassof first created PER within the International
Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in 1991. Kassof then left IREX to run PER fulltime
until his retirement in 2005. Although much of PER’s work required discretion,
none of it was secret. After PER officially closed its doors in 2012, Dr.
Kassof deposited all of the PER archives with the Public Policy Papers
collection of the Mudd Library at Princeton University where they are now
publicly available.
In January 2014 Allen Kassof was
invited to assess the state of interethnic relations in Romania and assist in
unblocking what was widely perceived as a stalled process. After several
fact-finding trips to Romania he proposed a round-table discussion involving previous
partners in the dialogue as well as the younger generation politicians that had
taken or were about to take their place. In this effort, Kassof was joined by
two former PER colleagues: Jonathan Rickert and Larry Watts.
Jonathan Rickert, a former U.S.
diplomat and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, had
already served for seven years on post in Romania when PER began and was subsequently
in charge of the Romanian desk at the State Department. Rickert later joined
PER’s Advisory Board, on which he served for many years. Larry Watts, a
diplomatic scholar and security and defense specialist, ran the Bucharest office
as PER’s senior consultant from 1991 until 1998, staying on in Romania to
continue work in the democratic reform of security sector institutions. Watts
served as liaison with the Friends of the Project on Ethnic Relations that
sponsored and organized the roundtables, as well as rapporteur.
Livia Plaks was another critical
actor in the PER effort in Romania. An American born in Transylvania, Livia was
affiliated with PER from its founding and served as its president from 2005
until 2012. Livia died suddenly in 2013 and is greatly missed.
Motivations for the Autonomy Project
The discussion began with the
presentation of a nationwide public opinion poll commissioned expressly for the
roundtable on the topic of autonomy.[7]
Not surprisingly, knowledge of the formal autonomy project was relatively low
given that it was officially launched only two weeks earlier.[8] Thus,
56% of the Romanian population remained unaware of the project and only 28%
knew what it was about. However, 89% of all respondents viewed an ethnic
autonomy project in largely negative terms while only 6%, roughly the percentage
of ethnic Hungarians in the population, viewed it in positive terms.
While concern about serious ethnic tensions
and conflict did not preoccupy the overwhelming majority of respondents, a
significant proportion (27%) did view interethnic conflict as possible. More
than three-quarters of those believed that conflict was most likely to be
instigated by ethnic Hungarians. As the poll presenter explained, these public
perceptions constitute significant hurdles for advancing any autonomy project
that did not address adequately the fears and preconceptions of the majority
population.
In addressing the question of “why
now,” several Hungarian participants explained that, electoral considerations
aside, there were two proximate causes for the autonomy project at this time.
In fact, autonomy projects had been discussed within the leadership of the
Hungarian community since the early 1990s. However, advancements in cultural
autonomy and political access – in no small part due to the efforts of PER
during that period – moved comprehensive autonomy projects to the back burner.
Especially significant in this
regard had been the semi-institutionalized process of regular consultation and
written protocols concluded between the UDMR leadership and the Romanian
government that were in operation from the early 1990s until 2004. The consultation-protocol
system was initiated under the 1992-1996 Administration of Ion Iliescu and the
center-left PSD (then-PDSR) government. The same system was maintained by the
center-right Democratic Convention governments under the 1996-2000 Constantinescu
Administration, and again by the center-left PSD under the 2001-2004 Iliescu Administration.
As one Hungarian participant noted, during 2003-2004 alone some 30 pages of
protocols were submitted by the UDMR and were realized together with the
government.
For reasons still unexplained the consultation-protocol
system ceased to exist under the 2004-2014 Basescu Administration and the
center-right PNL and PDL governments. As this system was shut down dialogue
withered, political access diminished, and frustration among ethnic Hungarian
political leaders and their constituents increased. Equally damaging was the persistence of past
accords remaining implemented and the apparently increasing frequency of
roll-back. The non-implementation or violation by local authorities of national
legislation on bilingualism and the display of regional flags on government
buildings in the Szekler region was a recurrent example cited by Hungarian
participants.
For a variety of reasons, including
the national focus on EU integration and the cooption of individual
representatives, projects for cultural autonomy were not introduced over the
last decade. Meanwhile, however, problems in the relationship accumulated after
2004 as movement on minority issues slowed to a halt and political access
steadily diminished. It became necessary to seek other means of protecting
rights won, addressing further needs of the community and gaining government
attention.
The other proximate motivation was
the nationalist and illiberal trend in Budapest and the breakdown of
Hungarian-Romanian relations at the state and government levels. Indeed,
Budapest’s history of unilaterally attempting to assert its sovereignty over
ethnic Hungarians in Romania, and its continued lobbying against the post-World
War I Treaty of Trianon recognizing Transylvania and the Szekler region within
it as Romanian territory, made it a highly confounding element in the ethnic Hungarian-Romanian
relationship within Romania even before the more extreme nationalism of current
Prime Minister Victor Orban and his ruling FIDESZ party.
Consequently, local calls for
political decentralization were frequently assimilated to Budapest’s calls for
something far more controversial, shutting down discussion of both. The error
of viewing the ethnic Hungarian leadership in Romania as secretly pursuing an
agenda that Budapest openly espoused was common at the beginning of the 1990s.
It was overcome only after multiple iterations of interethnic dialogue,
consultation and active political cooperation.
At the same time, Hungary remains
the cultural mother country and the political and financial assistance made
available to local leaders from Budapest has also supported the legitimate aims
of the local community. The resources provided from Hungary are also very
significant in terms of local ethnic Hungarian politics as, for example, in
Budapest’s financing of two much more radical parties to challenge the UDMR’s
preeminence as representative of the Hungarian community in Romania.
Inappropriate tendencies of the
Orban government to insert itself into interethnic issues in Romania, and their
resemblance to the exploitative “minority protection” practices of Vladimir
Putin, with whom Orban has become more closely allied, further complicates the
problem. Orban offers an alternative government audience for dissatisfied co-ethnics
and actively encourages co-ethnic communities in the “near abroad” to turn his
way.
Hungarian participants were divided
on the role played by the European Union. Some felt that the EU (and NATO) were
obliged to intervene while others felt that appeals to the EU or to other
international bodies is unlikely to yield results. Most agreed the basic
problem to be the EU’s unwillingness or inability to establish “solid” or
obligatory minority rights standards or binding legislation. Likewise, EU best
practices were not merely the result of legislation but also were dependent on factors
such as resource availability, bilateral relations with neighbors, etc.
The UDMR bore the brunt of
criticism from Budapest for closely cooperating with central authorities in
Romania. When the Romanian side disengages from that cooperation, when
agreements and legislation are no longer implemented and even begin to be
challenged, the UDMR is the first to experience the political cost both in
terms of the dissatisfaction of its constituents and pressure from more radical
organizations. More importantly, when the interethnic dialogue breaks down, when
accords and legislation are interpreted ambiguously or implemented
inconsistently, it is incumbent on the UDMR leadership to come up with some other
way of protecting, guaranteeing and furthering the rights of ethnic Hungarians
in Romania.
While recognizing that there is no
“once and for all” solution to minority issues, that it is a matter for
constant debate and adjustment in order to accommodate new generations and new
expectations on all sides, the autonomy project was introduced in part to
redress the breakdown of the dialogue and of the consultation-protocol system,
and in part to protect the independence of the Hungarian community from more
radical external and internal pressures. As one Hungarian participant
underscored, “we can keep Orban and Putin out by resolving our own situation.”
As one Hungarian representative explained,
ethnic Hungarians were interested not in separatism but in an autonomy for the
Szekler region embodying the best practices of the European Union.[9] The
Hungarian community had no interest in creating a breakaway area.
At the same time, the
representative insisted that only the minority was in a position to judge
whether specific problems were resolved and the merit of their manner of
resolution, indicating an apparent tension between concepts of local authority
and the importance of joint Romanian-Hungarian assessment to render solutions
acceptable to both sides.
Specific Issues and General Frameworks
The first roundtable identified
four issues of immediate concern: the local use of the Szekler flag, economic
development (particularly in terms of a highway linking the Szekler region with
the rest of Romania and Europe), the implementation of bilingualism, and ethnic
proportionality in public institutions.[10]
If the breakdown of cooperation and regional radicalization were the general
motivations for the autonomy project then these issues constituted the specific
proximate motivations. In the three and a half months following the first
roundtable, there had been little progress.
Even if, in light of the upcoming
elections, no major progress had been anticipated, the fact that legal
processes against local Hungarian authorities regarding the use of the Szekler
flag and bilingualism continued during that period was viewed as a cause for
concern. Both sides had a stakeholder interest in legitimatizing both the
dialogue and closer political cooperation to their respective constituents.
However, this effort suffered when the dialogue yielded little or no results.
Lacking results, participants lost both credibility and authority and the very
idea of dialogue was undermined. Achieving some concrete results after a steady
deterioration of interethnic conversation over the last eight years of the
Basescu Administration was now more imperative than ever.
When asked by an American
participant if the display of the Szekler flag was problematic before 2007, a Hungarian
respondent explained that the issue first appeared in 2008 and became more
problematic since 2010.[11]
Likewise, there were continued problems in implementing the law on bilingualism
regarding signs and language use in administration where a minority comprised
at least 20% of the community (one Hungarian respondent gave Targu Mures as
example of locally-based authorities raising discussion of rights already
guaranteed by law.)
One Romanian parliamentarian saw
the solution to the flag issue as “simple and straightforward,” if not exactly
easy. Each and every flag of Romania’s forty-one counties could be officially
displayed in front of the parliament building. Another parliamentarian
underscored that at the local level a possible solution could be legislating
the obligatory display of five flags – the municipal flag, county flag,
Romanian flag and the flags of the European Union and NATO – on all government
buildings, especially mayoralty and county council buildings. Implementation of
this measure throughout the country would remove it as a source of tension in
interethnic relations.
One participant suggested that a
related proposal within the autonomy project for recognizing Hungarian as an
official regional language might first be approached half-way; by formally
establishing it as a regional language without elevating to the same status as
the state language. Even prior to this, however, Romanian and Hungarian
participants were in accord that it was necessary to facilitate the use of
Hungarian in administrative institutions and the justice system where ethnic
Hungarians comprise 20% or more of the population, just as the law stipulates.
The underlying issue regarding regional languages, one Romanian participant
explained, was that they cannot be implemented without concrete understandings
of what recognition entails and the costs involved. Otherwise, the lag-time
between legislation and implementation can be very long indeed.
The specific problem of a highway
that would connect the Szekler region with the rest of Romania and with Europe
was the one area that had registered some progress since the first roundtable.
The last of three studies, including the feasibility study for the first
tranche of the highway between Brasov and Bacau that crossed the Szekler
region, had been completed and the highway was now included in the EU’s
transportation master plan and thus funded by Brussels. According to a Romanian
participant, this represented a win-win-win because the highway had also been
championed by Hungary. It was expected that the highway would be realized by
2018 - the centennial anniversary of Romanian unification.
Contrasting Perceptions
The discussion showed that the two sides
operated according to quite different perception biases. For example, the
minority tended to see the greatest problem of the EU as national –
specifically related to national minorities. Thus, one Hungarian participant
described the war in Ukraine, tensions in Spain, and the close separatist
referendum vote in Scotland as all due to “majority arrogance” and “lack of
sufficient empathy” for minority rights. From this perspective the clear
solution was in the further granting of rights and full autonomy.
In contrast, majority leaders
viewed the problem as one of national security and territorial integrity. From
their perspective the Russians invaded and annexed parts of Ukraine primarily
in order to block Ukraine’s further integration with the European Union.
Minority rights in that scenario constituted, at best, a justification and
cover for more aggressive designs. Generally speaking, the majority was much
more sympathetic to the national/state interest concerns of Madrid and London
as well. As one Romanian participant explained it, “for us the problem is not
strictly tied to superior rights or positive discrimination but to the
prosperity and security of nations/states.”
Likewise, when ethnic Hungarian
leaders assessed the situation in Romania they tended to compare it with what
they perceived as “best practices” – usually the most autonomous cultural and
territorial arrangements in Europe. They paid less attention to the special
circumstances of those arrangements or to Romania’s more general standing in
terms of minority rights in Europe. Consequently, Romania’s – in their view – less
than ideal arrangements constituted problematic shortcomings and even
discrimination.
In contrast, Romanian authorities
tend to compare their country’s performance in recognizing and implementing
minority rights against that of all the other EU members, focusing almost
exclusively on issues of cultural autonomy.[12]
When ethnic Romanian attention is drawn to the territorial autonomies within
Europe its focus tends to rest on the special circumstances of each case.
Role of International Actors
At several points the discussion
revisited the issue of international organizations and outside actors in
influencing or determining the structure of ethnic relations in Romania.
Several Hungarian participants voiced dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of
EU and NATO attention to the topic in contrast to the 1990s, when it seemed to
form a central preoccupation. EU documents were both praised and criticized for
setting out best practices and standards and lacking any obligation or
enforcement.
As the American moderator noted “in
reference to intervention of international organizations – it does have
historical precedence when Romania was up for memberships NATO, EU, Council of
Europe, so it was not invented by the minority but was something those
organizations brought. There was ample precedent in the 1990s – whether or not
it is relevant now is another question.”
One Hungarian participant point out
that there was no need to fear the involvement of the United States, European
Union or the Council of Europe, nor should the fact that they “still have
something to say about the minority issue” be rejected. It was precisely the
monitoring by these entities that dispelled misconceptions of gross
discrimination and, in the end, “proved that Romania did not need monitoring.” Likewise,
the existence of very many different approaches within the EU guarantees that the
EU will never force a specific approach upon any of its members. The same is
true of the United States, as President Carter explained during the PER meeting
at the Carter center in 1995 regarding regional languages especially. While
solutions must be sought and found by Romanian citizens themselves,
international actors often have pertinent experience that may be useful, their
involvement (even if as observers) helps to validate the process, and they can
help to ensure that the process and circumstances are more accurately
understood internationally.
Several Romanian respondents
pointed out that the manner of international involvement is very important.
When part of a voluntary integrative process, as with NATO and the EU, such
involvement was perceived as legitimate and experienced as an objective institutional
process rather than political and partisan process. However, if such
involvement occurs as the result of appeals made to international organizations
over the heads of state and governmental authority, or if intervention is
advocated from actors that previously claimed Romanian territories and
populations, then the perception is very different. Anything resembling such an
appeal to international arbitration, after the Romanian experience of 1940 when
Hitler and Mussolini “arbitrated” the temporary loss of Transylvania, constitutes
the kiss of death for such involvement.
Decentralization, Sovereignty and the Redefinition of Autonomy
One of the most persistent hurdles in interethnic
accommodation arises when heightened fears of loss of identity by minority
groups clash against heightened fears of loss of sovereignty and territorial
integrity by the majority. The terminology of the debate often contributes to
tension. For example, autonomy is synonymous with independence, which often
invokes fears of separatism. A similar problem arises when decentralization of
political authority and decisionmaking is conflated with a transfer of state
sovereignty. These semantic hurdles assume even greater proportion when an
outside power makes unilateral claims of sovereignty over the minority
population or the territory on which it resides. This tends to create
hypersensitivity towards any constitutional, legal or political action that
could legitimize secession, diminished sovereignty or autonomy.
The problem of terminology was evident at several points
during the roundtable discussion, whenever introduction of autonomy or partial
autonomy was raised. One proposal suggested “sovereignty be delegated” to the
minorities much like Romanian authorities had delegated portions of sovereignty
to the International Monetary Fund or to the European Union, “on the basis of a
contract.” A contract in which both sides accepted various obligations. Another
proposal suggested experimenting with specific kinds of autonomy for limited
periods. For example, a temporary grant of fiscal autonomy such that, if no
growth is achieved within three years then the experiment end within in five
years.
The main counterargument was that the contractual basis
regarding the harmonization of policy with international organizations of which
Romania was a member was radically different from an arrangement that
undermined the state’s basic contract, the constitution. There is also a
confounding problem in any autonomy experiment. Although international law
recognizes that state authorities are the only ones with the right to grant
autonomy (or not), there is a significant body of international legal opinion
that holds that autonomy once granted cannot be revoked without international
legal consequences.
Central authorities often resist political
decentralization for fear that it may permit or facilitate secessionism.
However, the failure to empower local authorities provokes exactly the sort of resentment
and resistance towards central authorities that motivates demands for greater
local and regional autonomy, and more seriously challenges the state’s
sovereign control.
A different dynamic ensues when sovereignty and decentralized
political power are viewed separately, the first as uncontested state control
over its territory and a guarantee that locally delegated decisionmaking powers
are not be abused for secessionist purposes and the second as the necessary
power and resources to permit local authorities to more efficiently administer
their community. When the issue of state sovereignty is separated from that of political decentralization and, equally important, when central authorities
openly support and take an active role in implementing that decentralization,
sovereignty is strengthened rather than diminished. Active engagement is key to
establishing a wide array of crosscutting partnerships further binding the
local community with the state/nation.
Redefining Autonomy: Hungarian Perspectives
The American moderator summarized
the dilemma of overreliance on the various documents of the OSCE, EU and
Council of Europe as the legal basis for many of the desiderata in autonomy
draft. Generally speaking, they remain "open to various and conflicting
interpretation,” are often ambiguous, and do not create obligations but limit
themselves to recommendations. Given this, he proposed an exercise to the
Hungarian participants: “How,” he asked, “would you persuade those in political
system that it is right, profitable or efficient to accept the autonomy
proposal without clear international obligation? What would make your Romanian
partners comfortable with either the whole project or significant portions of
it?”
Continuing the point, the moderator
underscored the impression shared by the other American participants that
concepts and terminology with emotive content may be a stumbling block to discussion
and resolution of concrete problems. For example, “the interests of Hungarian community
are subsumed under heading of autonomy” while Romanians tended to equate
autonomy with separatism and the loss of state sovereignty. “I am wondering whether
and to what degree the use of word autonomy has become an impediment. What
would happen if you reframed the project as a question of equal rights, because
many of the points you raise are equal rights. Might you get to where you want
by dropping autonomy? Is it possible, without sacrificing any of the
community’s needs, to reframe this as a tactical matter?”
Several respondents explained that
while the concept of autonomy and the project itself no longer sparked fear
within the Romanian parliament when introduced in open discussion, neither did
it inspire enthusiasm and engagement on the part of the parliamentarians. Although
the 2014 autonomy project was more refined than former proposals, circumstances
were felt to be far from the point where a global project could be seriously
considered before each of its elements had been discussed, understood, and
decided upon separately.
Hungarian respondents were not
averse to an alternate approach. As one explained, the autonomy project had two
main elements: political-economic decentralization and minority protections.
Thus, it was possible to approach the main issues with other terminology.
Another participant reminded those
at the table how and why the autonomy project came to be proposed. Whereas
PER-facilitated discussion, argument, and offer and counter-offer had resulted
in a dialogue with authorities that rendered important progress in interethnic
relations during a period of considerable tension in the 1990s – specifically
regarding the wars in Yugoslavia and the ethnic clash in Targu Mures in March
1990 – that dialogue had all but evaporated over the last decade. The problem
was “how to get Romanian authorities to listen.”
Underscoring that there was no
analogy to that tension and violence today, the respondent explained that there
were nonetheless examples of neglect not only for long-standing Hungarian
desiderata but also for legislation passed but not implemented. For example, the
issues of the Szekler flag and bilingual inscriptions are perceived as
instances of existing legislation ignored by local judicial authorities. Issues
of major symbolic and practical value to the community are resolved inconsistently,
even idiosyncratically, such that a Hungarian-language medical school or
faculty is not problematic in one city (Cluj) but does create problems in another
(Targu Mures), even though other Hungarian-language faculties exist in the same
city without creating any tension or problems. Community needs could certainly
be addressed issue by issue, but that first requires that the dialogue be
reconstructed.
Redefining Autonomy: Romanian Perspectives
Referring to the Poll results
showing that 78% of the Romanian population was hostile to the autonomy
project, Allen Kassof turned to the Romanian participants and asked what
specific problems they had with it. “Suppose the autonomy concept had another
name, would you accept that? If not then why would it be unacceptable either to
the political class or to the population?”
The main problem, according to one
respondent, was “not content but context.” First of all, the timing chosen to
launch the autonomy project immediately before a national election was
potentially disastrous. The project could and probably would become a political
football, diminishing the possibility that it would be discussed seriously. Secondly,
the project was being introduced in the midst of a European-wide trend toward
nationalism and extremism, and it was not so easy for Romanians to
differentiate reasonable ethnic Hungarian demands from the aggressive rhetoric
of the Hungarian government, particularly when the latter was splashed all over
the international press. Launching the project at this time, it was feared,
could very well provoke nationalist discourse in response.
Author’s
Note: In spite of such fears,
throughout 2014 and as of this writing (March 2015) Romania remained a happy
exception to the general resurgence of nationalism-extremism in Europe. The
Romanian electorate excluded extremist parties from their parliament from 2008
and from the European Parliament since 2011. Suspicions that the extremist
parties and their agendas had been absorbed into the mainstream parties and
that they, along with the general population, had swung to the extreme right
(or far left), also proved to be unfounded. In November 2014, for the first
time in its history, Romanians elected a non-ethnic Romanian as President of
their country.
Several Hungarian participants
acknowledged that the timing of the project was not ideal and that serious
discussion of the elements of their proposal would doubtlessly occur only several
months after the election. They pointed out, however, that there were both
internal and external reasons forcing their hand. One representative noted with
some frustration that it had been ten years since the consultation-protocol process
ceased functioning before the Hungarian leadership took the next step and
introduced their project. “In the meantime, new parties formed and began
pressing precisely on those things that remain unimplemented. Having no other
responsibilities, they radicalized. And they have some justice on their side
because we did fail to implement those things.”
Another representative exhorted
everyone to bear in mind the fact that one of the more radical parties had
already garnered more votes than the UDMR in Sfantu Gheorghe. “If we do not
succeed then, in another five years, there could be some other politicians
sitting here who are much more radical.”
A second problem identified by the
Romanian participants (and also acknowledged by ethnic Hungarian
representatives) was the over-ethnicization of issues with much broader
applicability. For example, significant elements of ethnically-based autonomy
would be addressed in genuine political decentralization. Ethnic Hungarian
politicians serving at the national level might consider thinking of and
approaching problems in national-level terms, recasting their proposals as
measures to improve the country, not just the community. The respondent
stressed that this was neither a criticism of the mission of ethnic Hungarian
representatives nor an attack on their loyalty to their constituents but rather
a suggestion to improve the acceptability of their proposals and gain support
beyond the ethnicity.
Over-ethnicization was especially
problematic because of the noxious impact that Orban’s policies in Hungary and
towards neighboring states had on the majority’s perception of the ethnic Hungarian
community’s pursuit of its needs. As one Romanian participant explained, “we had
not anticipated that so soon after World War II it would be possible for
borders to be redrawn in Europe through force. The increasingly evident link
between Moscow and Budapest in energy and finance as well as in domestic and
foreign policy creates nervousness. When Orban then takes up Moscow’s
proprietary approach to co-ethnics in the ‘near abroad,’ Romanians get
worried.”
Arguing the need for greater
pragmatism, one participant strongly recommended that impact studies regarding
the economic, political and social consequences and foundation arguments be
included in autonomy proposals. The respondent, a parliamentarian, complained
that he was “fed up with draft legislation introduced in Parliament without
foundation arguments,” which virtually guarantees “unwelcome surprises.” Arguments
set out beforehand allowed one the opportunity to address issues logically and
preempt unnecessarily partisan debate, thus making it easier for others to
support proposed legislation.
The American moderator noted that
while impact statements and a focus on the needs of region rather than just
those of the ethnicity are a good idea, they do not necessarily encompass “the
important question of national self-identification and cultural preservation” for
ethnic Hungarians. This, he stressed, was a “serious request and felt need”
that might not be covered by impact analysis unless national identity is
specifically included.
Restoring Consensus
Several participants identified
communication as a continuing barrier to understanding. The principal problem,
not unrelated to the isolation of the area from main transportation routes, was
the access of Hungarian-speakers in the Szekler region to Romanian-language
news. Thus, the establishment of a bilingual news website was proposed both to
address this shortcoming and as a media statement.
There was a general recognition
regarding the fact that the bulk of the participants in the roundtable were
parliamentarians, including parliamentary group leaders, and that their jobs
predisposed them to dialogue and discussion. The situation was more
complicated, however, at the party level. There, the tendency to seek out and exploit
vulnerabilities of political competitors could still led to nationalist
discourse, especially during electoral campaigns. As one Romanian participant noted,
despite the fact that all of the parties had cooperated with the UDMR for
governance, and that the UDMR was often made part of government, the parties in
opposition exploited that political cohabitation from the nationalist
perspective, accusing the ruling parties of the moment of “giving everything
away” to the Hungarians. Another participant added that although the population
had little problem with cohabitation, political elites repeatedly took recourse
to the national/ethnic card.
The need to overcome this dysfunctional
retrogression, one that was characteristic neither of relations within the
population nor of the actual operations of government, led several participants
to recommend “an all-party pact like we did for EU integration.” One
participant specified that decentralization should be broached the national
level for all regions and localities, with special aspects for minorities
forming local majorities, so that it is “neither worrisome nor a political
football.” As he observed: “A pact on this problem, on the manner in which we
approach decentralization and regionalization, is necessary because it cannot
be done by one party, and we are all in this together.”
Another participant suggested the
use of Romania’s comparative advantages. Returning to the polling data
presented at the beginning of the roundtable, he pointed out that the social
distance information was heartening. Some three-quarters of the ethnic Romanian
population had a good or very good opinion of Hungarians; 85% appreciated them
as work colleagues, 80% as friends, 78% as neighbors, 71% as family members,
and 46% as political representatives.[13]
A number of participants
specifically referred to the Snagov example when expressing their support for
the idea of an all-party pact to neutralize tendencies of exploiting
nationalism and ethnicity for political advantage. In a display of political
accord unmatched in Central or East Europe, Romania had surprised the United
States and NATO in 1993 when it launched the first “Snagov Declaration” in
which every political party from the extreme left to the extreme right declared
NATO membership as their number one national priority. A second Snagov
Declaration expressing wholehearted support for EU integration was signed by
all of the political parties and submitted along with Romania’s EU application
in 1995.
The Snagov declarations created a
precedent for cross-party agreement on issues of national interest. One
reflection of this legacy was a largely successful 2004 agreement, moderated by
PER, in which all of the political parties agreed not to exploit ethnicity as a
political slogan during the election that year. As successful as that agreement
was it remained, nonetheless, a “gentlemen’s agreement” rather than a national
commitment.
Restarting The Process
The American moderator started off
with the admonition that old business needed to be dealt with in order to
better address new business. Recalling that, at the first roundtable, the UDMR
representatives had described how the institutional basis for the good
cooperation begun in 1993 had broken down in 2004, and that less formal means
of advancing community interests and priorities had slowed to a halt by 2007,
the moderator concluded that, clearly, “some important business remains
incomplete.” To clear the decks for the next stage of interethnic relations it
was necessary to mutually identify “those things agreed that are not yet
accomplished” and the best means for fulfilling “commitments and promises
already made.”
Indeed, the need to identify a
specific list of issues for action after the election was voiced by both
Hungarian and Romanian participants.
Along these same lines, several
participants advocated restarting the PER process as an effective and
forward-looking manner of addressing these issues. One Hungarian participant
described how decisions reached under this process enjoyed 99% approval. While
it operated, the Romanian majority forced nothing upon the Hungarian community
against its will. Local leaders consulted weekly with their parliamentary
representatives and the system of memoranda and protocols remained in vigor
from 1993 through 2003, resolving many things in a step-by-step manner during
that period.
The greatest problem was that the
ensuing ten-year lag in which the process no longer functioned made everyone
involved look culpable – central Romanian authorities appear guilty for the
non-implementation of accords and legislation at the local level, and UDMR
representatives appear guilty for failing to advance the interests and fulfill
the needs of their constituents, creating motivation for the previously
discussed radicalization. Particularly troublesome in this regard was the issue
of local flags, draft legislation regarding which was written together with the
parliamentary group leader of the ruling party at the beginning of 2014 but was
still hanging fire in parliament.
A Romanian veteran of the PER
process described how, during 2000-2004, Romanian authorities met with the
Hungarian community leaders in all of the sixteen counties where they resided.
After 2004, however, these regular visits ended. Likewise, prior to 2004 there
was a designated group that met every Monday in the office of the Senate Vice
President to discuss Hungarian issues. The same participant was responsible for
monitoring the government implementation of parliamentary decisions on those
issues. Now, there is no designated group and no one responsible for monitoring
follow-up. The result was not surprising. “Decisions might be taken and
agreements might be reached but nothing happens.”
In order for the process to be made
predictable, consistent and frequent meetings were necessary. Moreover, a joint
working group should be created that was capable of following through and
monitoring implementation. And the first step should be a commonly agreed list
of what is possible. Recalling that the interethnic problem was one of
management rather than final resolution, the Romanian participant suggested the
two sides discuss a pact of the Snagov variety and a restoration of the
protocol system as well as a series of specific issues of more immediate
concern that might be resolved more quickly, after the elections.
A Hungarian veteran of the PER
process observed how much both sides had evolved in their ability to discuss
sometimes thorny problems of substance in reasonable terms. He expressed his
conviction that the discussion would be continued in more detail after the
election. Although the problem of radicalism and extremism might require
continued vigilance, the participants could all be thankful that ethnic
Romanian and ethnic Hungarian politicians had shown “the wisdom to cooperate in
parliament and in government.” He advocated, first, solidarity regarding the
national interest because there was “no great difference between Romanian
national interest and the national interest of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.”
Secondly, Romanian authorities and their ethnic Hungarian colleagues should
proactively engage issues of regionalism and use of the mother tongue in order
to set forth their own mutually-derived ideas instead of simply responding to
ideas formed elsewhere by others, or defaulting to a pattern of avoidance. Most
of all, he counseled, the representatives gathered at the roundtable should
take full advantage of a stable legislature during 2015.
Allen Kassof concluded the meeting with
several general observations to be borne in mind as the process moves forward.
“As others have noted today, here is no final resolution to interethnic
relations. They are not a problem to be resolved but a dynamic process for
which new and more effective means of managing must be sought. Romania’s great
comparative advantage is that both sides are willing to speak with the other
and have accumulated long experience in so doing. While this is largely taken
for granted here its absence elsewhere in the region (and beyond) has repeatedly
led to violence. You have an additional advantage in knowing that the specific
issues that crop up in Hungarian-Romanian interethnic relations will be
resolved because you have resolved them in the past, repeatedly proving your
ability to resolve them no matter how intractable they may once have appeared.”
“Attention also must be paid to the
need for expressions of identity. Neighboring Hungary has always been a
complicating factor but it is particularly troublesome now because of its more
virulent form of nationalism and its impact on bilateral relations. In some
ways ethnic Hungarians here bear the burden of having to cope with pressures
from Budapest and with heightened expectations that they live up to their responsibilities
as Romanian citizens because of them. It falls to the local inhabitants to come
up with their own approaches and solutions. Budapest can advertise its interest
but it is still your issue and not theirs because you all live here and they do
not. While ethnic Hungarians have to be conscious of the radioactive fallout
created by Budapest at this time, Romanians have to give enough “room” to their
Hungarians so they can effectively deal with these pressures. Bear in mind that
there are also other, more radical and less reasonable actors more than willing
to step in at the first opportunity.”
“If past experience serves as a
guide then you can expect that you will achieve an imperfect but workable conclusion,
just as you have already done before and just as you are doing now, through discussion
and dialogue. We will help.”
The Romanian and Hungarian
participants expressed their thanks for restarting the dialogue after such a
long period where dialogue was lacking. There was unanimous agreement on the
need to hold another meeting as soon as practicable following the election.
List of Participants and
Observers
Participants and
observers attended in their individual capacities.
Affiliations are
noted for identification purposes.
UDMR
Antal Arpad Andras Mayor, Sfintu Gheorghe, Covasna
Antal Arpad Andras Mayor, Sfintu Gheorghe, Covasna
Tanczos Barna Senator
Marko Bela Senator
Erika Benko Counselor to Tamas Sandor
Laszlo Borbely Deputy
Csaba
Borboly President
Harghita County Council
Tamas Sandor President Covasna County Council
PSD
Viorel Hrebenciuc Deputy, Vice-President of Chamber of Deputies
Viorel Hrebenciuc Deputy, Vice-President of Chamber of Deputies
Georgian Pop Deputy
Angel
Tilvar Deputy
Ionut Vulpescu Deputy
Valeriu
Zgonea Deputy, President
Chamber of Deputies
PDL
Alexandru Nazare Deputy
Alexandru Nazare Deputy
Andreea
Paul Deputy
PNL
Alina Gorghiu Deputy
Alina Gorghiu Deputy
Dan
Motreanu Deputy
George
Scutaru Deputy
Presidency
Mihail Sandu Counselor to Presidential Adviser Iulian Fota
Civil Society
Ambrus
Attila Journalist
Emil Hurezeanu Journalist
Marius
Pieleanu Sociologist
Dan Tapalaga Journalist
Allen
Kassof Moderator
Jonathan
Rickert Moderator
Larry Watts Rapporteur
Organizer
Ionas Vladimir
[1] For the first roundtable see Larry L. Watts, “Interethnic Dialogue in the New Romania:
"Romanians and the Hungarian Minority Twenty-Five Years After the 1989
Revolution, 19-20 June 2014, Poiana Brasov,” https://www.academia.edu/12966725/Interethnic_Dialogue_in_the_New_Romania_I.
[2] Moscow claims authority over ethnic Russians in
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Baltic countries, and directly supports several breakaway ethnic regions in Moldova and
Georgia “beyond the control of the central governments where the local de facto
authorities enjoy Russian protection and influence.” See e.g. Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia's Latest Land Grab,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 93,
no. 3 (May/June 2014).
[3] Charles Gati, “The Mask Comes Off,” The American Interest, August 7, 2014.
Also rejecting of liberal multiculturalism, Orban declared that: “we let go of
the delusion of the multicultural society before it turned Hungary into a
refugee camp.” See e.g. “PM lets go, bounds free,” Budapest Times, March 6, 2015.
[4] See for example, “Ukraine rejects autonomy calls for
ethnic Hungarians made by Orban,” Reuters, June 3, 2014; Casey Michel,
“Hungary's Viktor Orban Walks in Putin's Footsteps,” The Moscow Times, August 5, 2014; Géza Jeszenszky, “Hungary, NATO
And The War In Ukraine,” Hungarian Review
4, no. 5, September 18, 2014.
[5] See e.g. Susanne Gratiu and Kai Olaf Lang, “Das
katalanische Labyrinth. Unabhängigkeit oder Verfassungsreform?” SWP-Aktuell (Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin), no. 5 (January 2015).
[6] PER also operated in the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and its successor states, Poland and the Russian
Federation.
[7] “Research Report: Nationwide Survey,” Avangarde – Grupul de Studii
Socio-Comportamental [Avangarde – Socio-Behavioral Study Group], Bucharest,
September 20-28, 2014.
[8] The full Romanian language text of the UDMR’s
autonomy project can be found at http://www.kelemenhunor.ro/uploads/files/doc/Statutul_Special_al_Tinutului_Secuiesc_din_Romania.pdf.
[9] The Szekler region comprises the largely Hungarian
counties of Covasna and Harghita and a section of the majority Romanian county
of Targu Mures where Hungarians form a local majority.
[10] The four issue areas came from an original list of
ten presented at the first roundtable. Although presented as a priority in both
roundtables, the issue of proportionality, specifically, how to go about
achieving it, had not yet been discussed at any length.
[11] Illegal display of flags on government buildings had
been an issue in Covasna in 2007 as well. See e.g. “Covasna County
Council Required to Take Down 25 Flags from its Own Building,” October 10,
2007, http://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/cj-covasna-nevoit-indeparteze-25-drapele-cladirea-proprie-10-10-2007.
[12] For example, the European Commission judged that
“linguistic and ethnic assimilation” were “less severe than in other Central
and Eastern EU countries” while the prestige, use and transmission of the
Hungarian language in Romania was “quite high.” European Commission, Presence of Regional and Minority Language
Groups in The European Union’s New Member States - Extension to Bulgaria and
Romania, Final Report, Brussels, June 17, 2009, pp. 6, 23, at http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/regional-minority-languages_en.htm.
[13] “Evolutii geopolitice si minoritati etnice din 2014:
100 de ani de la declansarea Primul Razboiul Mondial” [Geopolitical Evolution
and Ethnic Minorities in 2014: 100 Years after the Outbreak of the First World
War], Poiana Brasov, Romania, October 4, 2014.
