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| The Damage at Chernobyl |
Aside from the
being the worst nuclear disaster up to that point and an international
cautionary tale, creating a humanitarian crisis in the Ukrainian SSR and
derailing nuclear power plans throughout Europe for decades, Chernobyl was also
a demonstration of how little regard the USSR had for its allies. In its
efforts both to deal with the situation while covering up failings of the
Soviet system as much as possible, during the first critical week following the
accident Moscow failed to provide even basic information to its affected allies
that could inform their own responses. The repeated queries of the Romanian
leadership to Soviet officials posted to their country and back in the USSR
were met with stony silence. Not content to wait on the Kremlin’s convenience
in the developing crisis, and receiving no response to their requests for
information and expert assistance, Romania took the unprecedented step of turning
to the Americans.
Keeping An Eye On The Bear
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| Figure 1: The Zones of Radioactive Contamination[3] |
Consequently,
Bucharest knew that something had gone badly wrong in Chernobyl within hours of
the accident on April 26, 1986. During the first 48 hours Bucharest limited
itself to expressing general condolences for the fact of the accident to the Soviet
embassy, awaiting an official briefing on the situation that it knew would
surely follow in short order. However, by the third day it began asking
questions, but its repeated inquiries to Soviet authorities as to the nature of
the problem were either left unanswered or met with denial.
Romanian Military Intelligence on the Disaster
On
April 30, 1986, Defense Minister General Vasile Milea reported that, as of
April 26, the interception of Soviet military radio transmissions revealed that
the radioactive cloud of Cesium 137 and Iodine 31 created by the Chernobyl
disaster had reached the territories of Finland, Sweden, Norway and northern
Poland. Soviet authorities – Milea further reported – “had taken measures for
the evacuation of approximately 30,000 inhabitants for a
distance of 30 kilometers around the nuclear facility and the decontamination
of the population from the area.” Meanwhile, the general noted, the United
States “had ordered the constitution of an interministerial group to inform the
public and proposed that an International Commission be constituted to study
the effects of the nuclear accident.”[4]
An annex
subsequently added to the report noted that “an analysis of the current and
probable meteorological situation at the ground and at altitude indicates that
the circulation of air will become favorable for the transport and dispersal of
radioactive contaminants towards the territory of our country” over the next
few days, although not in life-endangering quantities.[5]
The Winds Change: May 1, 1986
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| Figure 2: The Direction and Speed of the Wind – 1 May 1986, 0003 hours |
The very next
morning Ceausescu reported in the meeting of the Political Executive Committee that
the feared and predicted wind change had indeed occurred, and that airborne
radiation levels had abruptly increased beyond the alarm threshold in Suceava,
Iasi, Tulcea, Targu Mures and Galati.[6]
The military alone
had 127 permanent monitoring stations measuring possible radioactive
contamination at ground level throughout the country. To this was added the
resources of the Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti and those of the Atomic Physics Institute at Magurele – some
40 mobile stations – also being deployed to the threatened areas.[7]
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| Figure 3: Military Network for Monitoring Radioactive Contamination |
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| Monitoring Station at Toaca Summit, Piatra Neamt |
Comrades, regarding the necessary measures, in the areas in which the levels of radioactivity have surpassed acceptable values, do we dispose of all that is required to deal with the problem? Or is this a case in which we should request some help from the Soviets, since they are better acquainted with it as they have had other accidents – not only now, with the same sort of damage?
Nicolae Ceausescu
Non-Existent Soviet Assistance
Faced with this
lack of any Soviet response, Ceausescu asked the committee whether there was
sufficient equipment and expertise in country to assess and deal with the
crisis by themselves, or whether this was a “case in which we should request
some help from the Soviets because they are better acquainted with the problem since
they had other accidents” resulting in “the same sort of damage.”[8]
 |
| Ion Ursu |
The Romanians were
clearly at a loss as to how to handle dangerous levels of contamination,
especially given their lack of certainty as to whether more was still being
produced by the burning nuclear facility at Chernobyl (or even whether it was
still burning at all).[9]
But their repeated attempts to extract information and elicit expertise from
Moscow were left unanswered.
After reporting that his requests to the Soviet
ambassador had gone unanswered, Ion Ursu, the de facto head of Romania’s
nuclear program, stated the belief that “for the moment, we have everything
necessary.”[10]
In a last effort to compel a response and obtain necessary expertise from
Moscow, Ceausescu ordered a direct approach from the Romanian Party leadership
to the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party.[11]
We should immediately call in the Soviet Ambassador and draw his attention to the situation that has been created as a result of their accident, underscoring that we must take measures as well. In light of this, we request that the Soviet specialists should make immediate contact with us so that we might receive some details regarding what must be done.
Communicate to the Soviet Ambassador that this request comes from the party leadership and should be communicated directly to his party’s leadership, and not sent along specialist lines.
Nicolae Ceausescu
Calling in the US “Cavalry”
By
this point, five days from the accident and after the contamination had already
reached Romania, Ceausescu and the rest of the leadership held out scant hope
that Moscow would be forthcoming either with information about the accident or
expert assistance to assess and deal with its impact on territory of their
country.
Shortly after the meeting,
the Romanian leadership appealed directly to the United States, requesting that
Washington send one of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency
Support Teams (NEST), made up of scientists, technicians and engineers, to
evaluate the immediate impact of the Chernobyl incident on Romanian territory.
In order to accomplish that mission the US team was granted uninhibited access
to all facilities and locations throughout the country.
A word of
explanation is necessary here because most Romanians and Americans are unaware
that despite the very different perspectives on domestic policy, and especially
on human and civil rights, that increasingly separated Bucharest and Washington
until the final breaking point – following Ceausescu’s unilateral renunciation
of its “Most Favored Nation” status in 1988 – the leaderships of both countries
often saw eye-to-eye on broader issues of international security and the American-Romanian
relationship was much closer than U.S. relations with any other bloc member.
 |
| General Vessey |
Thus, for example,
General John W. Vessey Jr. had been the first Chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces
Joint Chiefs of Staff ever to visit a Soviet bloc state one year earlier, in
March 1985. General Vessey met with Ceausescu as well as with Milea's predecessor, General Constantin Olteanu. Mircea Raceanu, the head of the North American department in the Romanian foreign ministry at the time, recalls that Vessey's visit was given "great importance" by the Romanian side as representing "the support given by the U.S. to Romanian foreign policy" as well as the "good relations between U.S. and Romanian military leadership."
That appreciation was shared by the Americans. As one U.S. authority reported, “The visit was so successful that General Vessey and Romanian military leaders even discussed hypothetical war scenarios, an unprecedented occurrence between members of the two confronting military alliances.”[12] In December 1985, when Washington re-imposed travel restrictions on Soviet bloc diplomatic and commercial representatives, Romanians were not placed in the same category.
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| Generals Vessey and Olteanu, 3/1985 |
That appreciation was shared by the Americans. As one U.S. authority reported, “The visit was so successful that General Vessey and Romanian military leaders even discussed hypothetical war scenarios, an unprecedented occurrence between members of the two confronting military alliances.”[12] In December 1985, when Washington re-imposed travel restrictions on Soviet bloc diplomatic and commercial representatives, Romanians were not placed in the same category.
 |
| General Milea |
Immediate U.S. Response
Therefore, at this
point, the Romanian dictator believed that the Americans were no military or
security threat to his country, and very much interested in its long-term
survival.
 |
| Amb. Roger Kirk |
As Roger Kirk, the
American ambassador at the time, recalls, “five days after the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster,” in a move that was “highly unusual for a Warsaw Pact member
in 1986” and “intriguing” to the United States:
Ceausescu
instructed his ministers to request that a U.S. team come to Romania to monitor
the amount of radiation Romania had received, as the Soviets had given the
Romanians very little useful information about the nature of the radiation
leaks or their effect. The U.S. team arrived within five days of the request
and received full access to Romanian monitoring installations. Its conclusion,
based on on-site observations, was that the radiation levels were not medically
significant.[14]
As with many of the other countries affected by the Chernobyl disaster, Romania subsequently devoted a great deal of its nuclear research attention to the issues related to nuclear safety. Scores, if not hundreds, of these studies and reports, many on Chernobyl itself, can now be found on the website of the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, unlike most of Europe, the Romanians did not veer even briefly from their plans to address current and future energy needs by developing nuclear power capabilities, even if other economic and political constraints - largely of the regime's own making - delayed their projects until after the collapse of communism.
[1] Paper
of General Ion Gheorghe, chief of the general staff during 1965-1974, presented
to symposium “The Romanian Army within
the Context of the Events of August 1968,” organized by the Alexander Ion Cuza
National Union of the Military Staff in Reserve and Retirement” as cited in Mihai
Retegan, In the Shadow of the Prague
Spring: Romanian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968, Iaşi,
Center for Romanian Studies, 2000, p. 191.
[2] Larry
L. Watts, A Romanian INTERKIT? Soviet Active Measures and the Warsaw Pact “Maverick” 1965-1989, Cold War
International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper #65, December 2012, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington
D.C., https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/romanian-interkit-soviet-active-measures-and-the-warsaw-pact-maverick-1965-1989. See also Larry Watts, The Soviet-Romanian Clash Over History, Identity and Dominion, Cold
War International History Project e-Dossier No. 29, March 2012, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-soviet-romanian-clash-over-history-identity-and-dominion.
[3] Annex
No. 1 entitled: “The Zones of Radioactive Contamination As A Result of The
Accident At The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant” identified (1) “Zone Radioactively
Infected as of 04.30,1986”; (2) “Zones of Probable Radioactive Infection in the
Following Days”; and (3) “Zone Most Powerfully Infected from Where The
Population Has Been Evacuated.” It was annexed to the defense minister’s Report
No. M.1922, ANR, Fond C.C. al P.C.R. Sectia Politico-Administrativ, dosar
42/1986, f. 11-13.
[4] Report No. M.1922 from Colonel General
Vasile Milea, Ministry of National Defense, to Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu,
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the
Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, April 30, 1986, Ibid.
[5]
The annex entitled “The Direction and Speed of the Wind Based on Observation
Data from May 1, 1986, 0300 hours,” illustrated the probable path of air
currents at altitudes of 1500, 3000 and 5500 meters. ANR, Fond C.C. al P.C.R.
Sectia Politico-Administrativ, dosar 42/1986, f. 13.
[6] Transcript of Meeting of the Political
Executive Committee of the C.C. of the R.C.P., Bucharest, May 1, 1986, ANR,
Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia Cancelarie, dosar 40/1986, f. 1-7.
[7] A
map of the military’s radioactive contamination monitoring system was included
as Annex No. 2: “System of Radioactive Contamination Observation and Warning of
the Army of the S. R. of Romania (127 Observation Stations)” which notes that
“The System Measures Levels of Radiation from 0.05 Milliroentgens per Hour
(mR/hr) to 3000 Milliroentgens/Hour” in ANR, Fond C.C. al P.C.R. Sectia
Politico-Administrativ, dosar 42/1986.
[8] Transcript of Meeting of the Political
Executive Committee, May 1, 1986, ANR, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia
Cancelarie, dosar 40/1986, f. 6.
[9]
Ibid, f. 6-9.
[10]
Ibid, f. 6.
[11]
Ibid. f. 9.
[12]
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great
Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War,
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute, 1994, p. 582.
[13] Roger
Kirk and Mircea Raceanu, Romania Versus
The United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989, New York, St.
Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 94. The U.S. press noted that “Milea was welcomed to
the Pentagon with military honors in a highly unusual visit,” held “extensive
talks with U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. William Crowe” and “met
with Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and other leaders.” Los Angeles Times and Detroit Free Press, October 31, 1986.
[14]
Kirk and Raceanu (1994), p. 81.
